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LONDON'S GREY MARKET IN ART

L INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the theft and smuggling of art works and antiques
have come to the forefront among lucrative criminal activities, surpassed
only by drug trafficking and arms dealing.' The total value of stolen art
alone has been estimated at $4.5 to $6 billion a year.2 While some works
are stolen in well planned, surreptitious raids, others are taken in broad
daylight in surprisingly amateurish ventures. 3 Many of the stolen objects
are taken from public collections in institutions such as churches or
museums, 4 and a very large number are now coming from the countries of
the former Eastern bloc.5 Not all thefts involve masterpieces of high value;
quite often smaller items of modest worth are taken because of their easy
portability.6 Since the chances of getting caught are relatively slight, and
even if the thief is arrested, the penalties can be light, the risk is apparently
well worth taking. Yet not all smuggled art is stolen from its original
owners. In some cases, the art is smuggled out of the country of origin to
contravene stringent export or cultural patrimony laws, 8 such as those in
1. Alison Roberts, London is MeccaforA rtSmugglers,TIMES (London), Feb. 24, 1993,
at 1.
2. Alan Riding, A rt Theft Is Booming, Bringing an Effort to Respond, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1995, at CI.
3. See, e.g., Francine Cunningham, The Art Take-A way, SCOTSMAN, June 22, 1995, at
16. In less than a minute, a visitor to the Louvre stole a Turpin de Crisse landscape by
cutting it from its frame. Id. Because he did not disturb the frame, no alarm sounded.
Id. A French student convicted of stealing a Renoir in 1992 reported that it was easier
than shoplifting a cassette from a music store. Dalya Alberge, On Loan to the
Connoisseurs of Crime. . ., INDEPENDENT, Dec. 2, 1993, at 25.
4. Alberge, supra note 3. Thieves frequently prey upon these institutions because they
can rarely implement stringent security measures for lack of funds. Id.
5. Cunningham, supra note 3.
6. Anthony Thorncroft, The Fine Art of Stealing an Old Painting, FIN. POST, Feb. 4,
1995, at 83. Of the 1.5 billion pounds worth of art and antiques stolen in Britain during
1993, most involved items with an individual value of less than a thousand pounds. Id.
Smaller items such a jewelry or silver are also easier to get through customs undetected.
Alberge, supra note 3.
7. Alberge, supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., Kingdom of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1986] 1 W.L.R.
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effect in art-rich nations like Greece and Italy, where it is virtually
impossible to export works of art.9 Not surprisingly, the burgeoning trade
in smuggled art has a fairly obvious motive: profit.'0 As one writer wryly
stated it, "Anything that finds buyers on the legitimate market will find
them on illegitimate market.""
Eventually, a large amount of these stolen works find their way to the
galleries and auction blocks of dealers in the United Kingdom- 2
According to a 1993 Interpol report, London had become the center for
selling and buying smuggled art. 3 As many as a quarter of all London
dealers have knowingly handled smuggled works of art or antiques. 4
These dealers often escape prosecution because they can easily deny that
they knew where an object came from, and rarely is there any proof that
they knew.' 5 Among the reasons that have been adduced to explain
London's high volume of trading stolen or illegally imported art works are
Great Britain's lenient import and export laws governing works of art and
antiques. 16 Moreover, London's large number of renowned galleries and
auction houses ensure many potential buyers so that the work will
command the highest possible price.' In addition, Great Britain has failed
to ratify international accords designed to combat the illicit art trade. Also,
the self-regulatory schemes adopted by art dealers have largely proved
ineffective. As a result, purveyors of stolen or illegally exported antiques
or works of art can easily get the items into Great Britain. They can then
have it sold there for the highest price because of the brisk market.

1120 (Ch. Div'l Ct. 1986).
9. Roberts, supra note 1.
10. Thorncroft, supra note 6. Works of art have also become attractive to drug traffickers either for money-laundering purposes or for collateral on deals. A pair of Turner
paintings belonging to the Tate Gallery and stolen in 1994 are believed by the museum's
director to have been sold to the drug trade for use as collateral. Id. Similarly, "a couple
of Colombian drug barons have recently been revealed as having a penchant for the
Impressionists, while Caravaggio's Nativity, stolen in 1969 from Palermo, is widely
rumoured to be on some Mafia godfather's walls." Alberge, supra note 3.
11. Alberge, supra note 3.
12. Roberts, supra note 1; Gervase Webb, London "Centre of Looted Antiquities,"
14; London Is the World's Leading City for Looted

EVENING STANDARD, Oct. 11, 1995, at
Antiquities, GUARDIAN, July 7, 1990,

at 2.

13. Roberts, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. According to official figures, 2,400 art dealers operate in London. Id.
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Finally, purchasers can leave the country with the items with a minimum
of difficulty. This note outlines how the legal dimensions of each of the
factors have helped make London the capital of the illicit art trade, as well
as explores some possible means of lessening its severity.'"
II. IMPORT REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Theoretically, rigorous import controls could help stern the flow of
illicitly exported works of art by inserting an additional inspection step,
which would make the discovery of suspicious items more likely.' 9 This
measure would be even more effective if the laws of the source country
In
were given effect should an illegally exported item be discovered.
actual practice, however, few states expressly regulate the import of
cultural property. 2 They may be more or less compelled to advocate free22
flow of goods by virtue of their trade agreements or economic policies.
Furthermore, nations that view market forces as benefitting them naturally
tend to avoid imposing market controls. 23 Finally, the export laws of
another country are unlikely to be enforced outside its borders.24

18. 3 LYNDEL V. PROTT & P. J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE 561
(1989). By illicit art trade, I am following the definition set forth by Prott and O'Keefe:
An object being illicitly trafficked . . . is one in respect of which
some offence has been committed: such an offence is defined by the
laws of the country of origin and may include clandestine
excavation, theft, breach of inalienability of rights of preemption,
failure to comply with trading regulations or violation of export
control.
Id. Illicit trade is to be contrasted with "legitimate trade," which " includes any sale.or
other passing of ownership by an owner which is in accordance with the law within the
State where the owner holds the object." Id. at 560.
For an evaluation of recent scholarship in this area see John Henry Merryman, Book
Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 737-42 (1991) (reviewing THE ETHICS OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., 1989);

JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES (1989); and LYNDEL V.
PROTT & P. J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE (1989)). Carmina M. Diaz,
Art Law Research: An Introduction, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 335, 335-47 (1994). Diaz's article
serves as a useful research tool. Another scholarly study in this area is Paul M. Bator, A n
Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275 (1982).
19. PROrr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 576.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 584.
23. Id. at 576. France and Austria exemplify this tendency. Id.
24. See infra Part II C. Courts have relied upon this principle of international law in
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A. Laws Regulating Imported Goods
The United Kingdom falls into the category of nations perceiving
themselves to be favored by market forces.2" In general, the importation
of goods into the United Kingdom is governed by orders promulgated by
the Board of Trade, which is granted that authority under the Import,
Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939.26 The Import of
Goods (Control) Order requires all imported goods to have a license;
however, the Department of Trade and Industry issues an "Open General
Import Licence," or GIL, allowing import of all goods except those coming
from specifically excluded sources. 2 At present, the order excludes no
cultural property.28
B. Import Taxes
The United Kingdom currently does not impose a value added tax
(VAT) on the import of art works. 29 The art market has supported the
exemption of art works from the VAT, out of fear that imposition of the
tax would drive art buyers toward countries not subject to EEC directives,
such as Switzerland or the United States. 30 This lack of encumbrance
creates a freer flow of art, legitimate or otherwise, into the London market.
C. U.K. Approach to Import of Illegally Exported Items
Theoretically, when a country makes a claim to an object exported in
contravention of its laws, the inquiry should balance the interests of the
country of origin against those of a possibly innocent purchaser. 3' The

refusing to recognize another country's claims that an art work was illegally exported,
absent a treaty to the contrary. See, e.g., Jeanneret v. Vichey, 693 F.2d 259, (2d Cir.
1982) (American court's refusal to lend validity to Italian export law).
25. PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 576.
26. Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 2 &3 Geo. 6, ch. 69, §

1(1) (Eng.).
27. PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 579.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 594. Nor is a VAT imposed upon the full value of the market sale of a work,
but the dealer's profit margin and the auctioneer's commission =xe subject to VAT. Id.
30. Id.
31. Susan M. Nott, Title to Illegally Exported Items of Historic or A rtistic Worth, 33

INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 203, 203 (1984).
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country of origin might well expect the return of such an object.32 In
practice, however, British courts will not enforce foreign legislation
authorizing the confiscation of property.3 3 Thus, in the hypothetical case
where a foreign country's export law prescribes confiscation of the goods
for violation of the law, the country would not be able to enforce
confiscation in a British court should the goods arrive in Great Britain.34
In Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, the plaintiff attempted
to circumvent this rule by arguing that title had already vested in New
Zealand by virtue of the statute, so the British suit was seeking
enforcement of title, not enforcement of the statute's confiscation
provision. 35 The case involved a Maori carving exported from New
Zealand without the proper documents, in contravention of New Zealand's
Historic Articles Act 1962.36 The carving was sold to one Entwistle, who
in turn sold it to Ortiz. 37 When Ortiz consigned the carving to Sotheby's
in London for sale, the New Zealand government filed suit to recover the
object.38
New Zealand's argument that it was entitled to take the carving did not
succeed.3 9 The court followed a narrow statutory interpretation in deciding
the matter, and ruled that under the wording of the Historic Articles Act,
forfeiture was not automatic. 40 The court ruled that title could not have
passed to New Zealand unless the government had actually reduced the
object to possession at some point, which had not occurred.4' The House
of Lords never had to answer whether they would enforce New Zealand's
claim to title arising because of this illegal export, because they found that
the construction of this particular statute could not grant title to New
Zealand under these circumstances. Accordingly, Ortiz does not settle the
question whether British courts will recognize a foreign government's claim
to title to an object when that claim arises from an illegal export.42

32. Id.
33. In re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd. [1956] Ch. 323, 345-46 (Eng.).
34. ld.
35. Attorney Gen. of New Zealand v. Ortiz, [1983] 2 All E.R. 93, 95 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 100.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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D. EEC Approach to Illegally Exported Items
The Council of European Communities promulgated a directive in
1993 to address the problem of illicitly exported cultural items. 4 3 The
44
directive became effective in the United Kingdom on March 2, 1994.
The directive dictates that when a member nation discovers that a cultural
object unlawfully removed from its territory is located within the territory
of another member nation, the aggrieved nation has one year to demand its
return.4 5 A competent court in the nation where the object has been
located, upon determination of the requisite criteria, orders its return to the
nation of origin.4 6 The same court can also order compensation to the
possessor, if found to be warranted.4 7 While the directive does address the
problem of unlawfully removed art and antiques, it only offers a limited
Its provisions only apply to members of the European
solution.
Community, so it provides no remedy for a non-member state to recover
an illegally removed item.
M1. EXPORT REGULATiONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The two principal methods a nation may use to limit export of art
works and antiques are prohibition and export licensing. 48 As the name
suggests, export prohibition stops the outward flow of art works
altogether. 49 The criteria most countries use to dictate requirements for an
export license are the age and value of the object. 5' Even if the country
has little wish to curtail exports of art and antiques, an export licensing
system can still provide a useful record of exactly what is leaving the

43. Council Directive 93/71EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects
Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State, 1993 O.J. (L 74) 74-79
[hereinafter Directive].
44. Id. annex at 78-79.
45. Id. art. 7 (1) at 76.
46. Id. art. 8.
47. Id. art. 9.

48. PROr &

O'KEEFE, supra

note 18, at 481.

49. Id. No export prohibitions on works of art are currently in force in the United
Kingdom. Id. at 482. Export prohibitions have been considered twice in the past, in 1913
and in 1952, but were both times rejected on the belief that compiling and updating the
lists of objects to be excluded would prove unworkable. Id. Export prohibitions today are
usually found in nations such as Nigeria and Iraq that have witnessed a grave depletion of
their cultural heritage. Id. at 481.
50. Id. at 479.
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country.5 Such a record can provide valuable information to scholars and
curators. 2 Export taxes can also be imposed to regulate the rate of
export. 53 Critics of export controls claim that the delay and expense they
54
cause leads to corruption by encouraging ways to circumvent the system.
A. British Export Licensing
In the United Kingdom, no export regulations apply to an object that
has been in the country for less than fifty years. 55 A license is required to
export antiques and collectors' items, including works of art, that have been
in the United Kingdom for more than fifty years.5 6 An "Open General
Licence" suffices to allow the export of antiques valued at less than the
statutory value.57
If a potential exporter applies for a specific license, the object becomes
subject to the state's right of pre-emption.5 8 Once the exporter requests a
specific license, it is routed to expert art advisers.5 9 If an adviser believes
the object is culturally significant, the application is then referred to the
Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art. 6' The Committee
then evaluates the work using the guidelines set forth in the "Waverly
Criteria.",6 1 Should the object be found significant to the British cultural

Id. at 484.
5 I.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 481. Most export tax systems operate in conjunction with a licensing system.

Id.
N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
54. Guy Stair Sainty, What Makes Italy a MajorBlack Market in A rt,

16, 1990, at A34. One New York art dealer has made this argument with respect to Italy's
export controls applying to art works. Id.
55. PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 496. The principal rationale for this
exemption is to stimulate the market: dealers would be less likely to import an object for
resale if such a resale could only be made to a national. Id.
56. Export of Goods (Control) Order 1985, reprinted in PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note
18, at 485.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 502.

59. Id. at 484.
60. Id.

61. Id. The Waverly criteria consist of three questions:
(i) Is the object so closely connected with our history and national life that its
departure would be a misfortune?
(ii) Is it of outstanding aesthetic importance?
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heritage, the state is given a period of time 62 to purchase the item itself.63
If the government fails to exercise this option, the export license is

granted. 64
This pre-emptive right of purchase can be effective only if the state
has access to adequate funds to exercise it.6 5 Toward that end, Parliament
passed legislation to provide for such purchases.6 6 This mechanism
prevented the export of a famous Canova sculpture to the United States
and allowed two leading British museums to purchase the sculpture together.67
The outcome of this particular application of the Export Control Order,
as well as its structure itself, suggests it is narrowly tailored to meet a very
specific purpose: to oversee, and when necessary retain, objects of

(iii) Is it of outstanding significance for the study of some particular branch of art,
learning or history?
Reprinted in PROT" & OKEEFE, supra note 18, at 484.
62. Usually, the government must purchase the object within six months. PROTT &
O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 485. However, courts have upheld the Committee's authority
to defer the decision regarding "outstanding objects." See, e.g., The Queen v. Secretary
of State for National Heritage, ex parte J. Paul Getty Trust (C.A. (Civil Division), Oct. 27,
1994) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, Engcas file) (upholding Secretary's decision to extend the
review period to eighteen months).
63. PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 502.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. National Memorial Heritage Act, 1980 (Eng.). The Act is administered by a board
of Trustees. Id. § 1.1. As far as purchasing art or antiques is concerned, the Trustees are
empowered to "make grants and loans out of the Fund to eligible recipients for the purpose
of assisting them to acquire, maintain or preserve ...(b) any object which in their opinion
is of outstanding historic, artistic or scientific interest" or "(c) any collection or group of
objects, being a collection or group which taken as a whole is in their opinion of
outstanding historic, artistic or scientific interest." Id. § 3 (1).
67. Rosanna de Lisle, The Sunday Statue, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 3, 1995, at 24. The
sculpture, the Three Graces, was originally commissioned by the sixth Duke of Bedford
in 1814, and housed in a specially-built temple on the grounds of his estate, Woburn
Abbey. Id. The statue went on the market and was purchased in 1990 for 7.6 million
pounds by the Getty Museum in California. Wendy Robertson, Grace, Beauty, and Joy
Move Into New Home, SCOTSMAN, Aug. 9, 1995, at 3. In May 1990, an export license
was refused for the statue. Carolyn Shelbourn, Saving Graces-The Protection of the
National Heritage, NEW L.J., at 772, 772 (1990). A national campaign was mounted to
purchase the statue involving the Victoria and Albert Museum, the National Gallery of
Scotland, and private contributors such as Baron Thyssen and J Paul Getty H (!), which
ultimately succeeded in raising the necessary funds to purchase the statue. Robertson,
supra note 1. The statue went on display at the National Gallery of Scotland in August,
1995, where it will remain until 1999. Id. Thereafter, it will rotate every seven years
between the National Gallery and the Victoria and Albert. Id.
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significance to British cultural patrimony. 6s As it applies solely to objects
that have already been in the United Kingdom for fifty years, it
cannot-nor is it designed to-detect items that were illegally removed
from abroad.6 9
Moreover, Britain's past experiences with a broadly-inclusive set of
export guidelines suggest that the United Kingdom would hesitate before
increasing the number of objects that would require an export license.
The present legislation is in fact a response to wide-reaching requirements
that proved cumbersome to implement. 7' Under the former system, all
antiques and works of art over seventy-five years old and valued at more
In 1950 alone, this
than 100 pounds were subject to export control.7
requirement yielded a staggering 16,500 applications, of which only thirtytwo were actually denied export. 7 The Waverly Committee undertook
study of the system in 1952, and recommended that export control be
limited to narrowly defined categories of highly important objects, and
these recommendations were in turn incorporated into the present scheme.74
Thus in 1950, when the art market presumably was considerably less active
than it is now, the export system had to be reformed to make it more
In light of these circumstances, the British government
streamlined.
would probably now approach any expansion of the requirements for
export licenses with caution.
B. EEC Export Regulations
The European Union deregulated its border controls in 1992.76 Even
prior to that date, some of the member states-especially art-rich

68. Nott, supra note 31.
69. Which is not to say that it does nothing to curb the illicit movement in art: take a
hypothetical case where an important work that has been in the United Kingdom for more
than 50 years is stolen. If an attempt were made to legally export the item, then it might
be under the enforcement of the present export order.
70. PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 480.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Clyde Haberman, Italy Fears That Its Art Treasures Will Scatter in a Unified
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at Al; See also Italy's Art Thefts Could Be Boosted
by Europe's Single Market, Reuters, Sept. 26, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters File.
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Mediterranean nations-expressed worry that opening the borders within
the EEC would facilitate illicit movement of cultural objects.7 7 There are
suggestions that individual European nations have been slow to convert the
EEC resolutions into domestic legislation. " In any case, it is probably too
soon to predict the effects of the EEC regulations.
C. Export Taxes
There is no export tax on works of art currently in force in the United
Kingdom.79 Historically, adoption of such tariffs has been rejected. 0
Moreover, the United Kingdom's membership in the European Community
adds a complicating factor should such a tax be contemplated now, because
the European Court of Justice has ruled that export charges imposed on
cultural property between member states violates article 16 of the Treaty
of Rome."' The Court ruled that an export tariff "hampers export trade in
the goods concerned."82 Consequently, while it is not impossible that the
United Kingdom might impose an export tax, it would almost certainly
have to tailor the legislation to exempt other EC members to avoid
violating this ruling. The potential complications of such a two-tiered
system make it seem unlikely that an export tax on art works and antiques
would be imposed now.
D. Conclusions on Export Regulation
In sum, the United Kingdom's restrictions on the export of works of
art are aimed at protecting its own cultural heritage rather than curtailing
the illicit trade in art. 3 Moreover, given the past experiences with a broad

77. Haberman, supra note 76.
78. Hugh Muir, Plenty of Optionsfor Gang Who Took Titian, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan.
4, 1995, at 4.
79. PRoT- & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 508.
80. Id. at 507. An export tax was first proposed with no success by George V in 1921
to counter what he perceived as the depletion of Britain's cultural heritage. Id. The idea
was also considered in 1952, but rejected on the grounds that it would be too difficult to
apply: it would be hard to fashion a working definition which would cover all possible
items to which the tax would apply, while compiling lists of specific items to be taxed
(should they ever be exported) would prove time consuming and cumbersome. Id.
81. Case 7168, Commission v. Republic of Italy, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) 1 8057
(1969).
82. Id.
83. PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 502.
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export licensing system, it appears unlikely that requirements will be
expanded any time soon. 4
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS

Commentators have stressed that the illicit
an international phenomenon and accordingly
international accords.8 5 While such accords
ratified by a number of countries, Great Britain
toward multinational agreements.

trade in art and antiques is
can best be dealt with by
have been proposed and
has thus far remained cool

A. UNESCO
The first international attempt to deal with the illicit art trade took
place a quarter century ago. 6 In 1970, the UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property issued a set of directives as a solution
on an international scale to the problem of illegitimate art sales.8 7 The
Convention called upon signatory nations to compile inventories of their
cultural property8 8 and to implement systems of export certification so that
all works leaving a country would be documented.89 Import controls
should be established, 90 as well as channels to return works discovered to
have been exported illegally.9 Nations could also be asked to cooperate
in emergency situations brought on by excessive pillaging of a given
country's artistic heritage. 92
The Convention, however, has been criticized for its narrow scope and
its failure to dictate a means of dispute resolution. 93 It protects only
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Lisa Marie Raffanelli, Note, A Comparative Study of Cultural Property
Import Regulation: The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, 15 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 543, 564 (1991).
86. Id. at 546.
87. Id.
88. 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, art. 5, 823 U.N.T.S. 231,
238.
89. Id. art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S at 240.
90. Id. art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236.
Id. art. 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
92. Id. art. 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242.
91.

93. Ann P. Prunty, Note, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the
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property taken from public spaces,9 4 and its prohibition on the acquisition
of illicitly imported works applies only to museums. Finally, it is not clear
through which channels a wronged party's property would be restored.9 5
Its weaknesses notwithstanding, the Convention at least offers a better
situation than existed before its formulation, and sixty-five countries,
including the US and Canada, have ratified the accord.
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom has refused to sign on to the
Convention.97 Britain objected to the accord on the grounds that the import
regulations it proposed would not be workable.9" However, the British
opposition more likely reflected the art market's fear that adoption of the
Convention would interfere unduly with the course of business and
possibly drive its clients elsewhere. 99
B. UNIDR OIT
Partly in response to the lack of adoption of the UNESCO Convention
on a global scale, the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law, or UNIDROIT, has drafted a convention to protect cultural
property.1 °° Drafting of the UNIDROIT Convention began in 1988, °l
and the latest meeting on this convention took place June 5-26, 1995.102
The UNIDROIT Convention differs principally from the UNESCO
Convention in that it would create litigable rights on the part of private
individuals seeking return of stolen or illegally exported cultural
property.'0 3 The convention would provide for the restitution of stolen or

Settlement of Cultural Property Disputes:How to Keep Greecefrom Losing its Marbles,

72 GEO. L.

1155, 1160 (1984).

94. Id. at 1160
95. Id. at 1166.
96. Muir, supra note 78.
97. Id.
98. PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 580.
99. Id.
100. RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 158 (Supp. 1992). UNIDROIT
is an international organization created for the purpose of harmonizing the laws of different
nations. Id. It is based in Rome and currently has a membership of fifty nations. Id.
101. Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3,
1995, at 5.
102. Smuggled Art Conference A ims to Harmonize Law, Agence France Presse, May
31, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
103. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 100, at 159.
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faith
illegally exported items, while still preserving some rights of good
status. 4
illicit
its
knowing
not
item
the
procured
who
purchasers
Upon discovering the whereabouts of such an object, its owner would be
able to sue for its return in the jurisdiction where it has been located,
provided both the country of origin and the country of present location
were signatories to the Convention. 0 5 The court could enforce return of
the object, regardless of whether the present possessor obtained the object
in good faith)0 6
A good faith purchaser is given two defenses in the Convention: a
statute of limitations and due diligence. 7 The draft of the Convention
states that the owner must demand the return of the object within one or
three years of discovering its whereabouts. Moreover, in no case could an
owner make a demand for return of an object after thirty or fifty years of
its theft or illegal exportation. 'n Museums would have a seventy-five year
statute of limitations. 9 Even if the possessor were required to return the
object, he or she could be eligible for compensation upon a showing that
0
he or she made a serious effort to discover the origin of the object."
These provisions were added to make art-importing nations more likely to
adopt the convention."'
At the end of the last meeting on the UNIDROIT Convention, almost
eighty nations adopted the Convention." 2 The United Kingdom was not
among them." 3 In the month preceeding the meeting, criticism of the
project had appeared in the British press.' 4 Among the reasons given for
opposing the Convention were its susceptibility to fraudulent claims: a
possessor could lose an object any time he or she could not adequately

104. Hoffman, supra note 101.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Sales of art would necessarily drop if buyers assumed the risk of having to
return objects they had no idea were stolen, with no reimbursement of their purchase price.

Id.
112. Olivier Baube, Nearly 80 Nations Sign Accord PurgingArt Market, Agence France
Presse, June 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
113. Id.
114. Georgina Adam, They're Out to Steal OurStolen Art, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 22,
1995, at 16.
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document its provenance, should a claim be initiated against him or her." 5
Other detractors pointed out that the Convention would require countries
to enforce other countries export laws. 1 6 Finally, opposition also came
from the art world:
one dealer declared it would render the entire market
"unworkable.""' 7 Despite the noble aims of UNIDROIT, the United
Kingdom seems unlikely to accept it for the foreseeable future." 8
V.

STEPS TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM

Before considering any potential solutions to the problem, it is first
necessary to acknowledge that the United Kingdom has historically been
conservative with respect to imposing regulations on the art and antiques
marketing industry." 9 Principal among the reasons for this resistance is the
fear that buyers and sellers will be driven elsewhere. 20 In spite of the
market's resistance to control, some important measures have been
implemented that address the problem of the illicit trade in art and
antiques: the abolition of market overt, the adoption of a code of practice
by dealers, and the foundation of the Art Loss Register.
A. Abolition of Market Overt
In 1994, the rule of Market Overt (or Ouvert) was abolished in
English law.' 2' The rule was effectively an exceptioni to the principle that

115. Id.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.

Id.
Id.

See, e.g., Muir, supra note 78.
120. Id.
121. Sean O'Neill, Law to Close Open Market in Stolen A rt, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug.
3, 1994, at 6.
The rule of market overt developed in the Middle Ages, at a time when most
goods were bought and sold at the local market and neither goods nor people
were normally mobile. If goods were stolen or mislaid they were likely to turn
up in the market because there were no other means of disposing of them, and
it seemed a reasonable duty to place upon the owner of the goods that he
should search for them in the market, and a reasonable protection for buyers
that one who bought in good faith from that market should get good title. The
rule of market overt applies these days mostly to a few ancient traditional street
markets and in modem conditions, where the population is no longer dependent
upon local markets for commerce and when goods stolen at lunchtime may be
several hundred miles away by sundown, the original purpose of the rule is
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a thief cannot pass good title to an object.' 22 Provided that the object was
sold during daylight hours in certain markets recognized by charter or that
have "existed since time immemorial," a buyer could automatically take
good title regardless of where the title of the object vested before the sale. 123
Said Lord Renton, who introduced the legislation to repeal the rule, "The
market overt rule is effectively a defense for anyone who is sued for
possession of stolen goods-he can plead that they were sold in the hours
of daylight at one of these ancient markets. It has become a thieves'
charter, and this law will abolish it."' 4
B. Attempts at Self-Regulation
In response to the growing problem of illicitly traded art, several
notable fixtures of the London art market have promulgated a voluntary
code of ethics entitled "Code of Practice for the Control of International
Trading in Works of Art."'1 5 The agreement took effect on April 1, 1984,
obsolete and the only purpose the rule now serves is that of assisting thieves
in the disposition of stolen goods and preventing the owner from recovering
them.
Sale of Goods Act, note (amended 1994) (Eng.).
122. See Sale of Goods Act, note (amended 1994) (Eng.).
123. O'Neill, supra note 121. The old rule was codified in the 1979 Sale of Goods Act:
"Where goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice
of any defect or want of title on the part of the seller." Sale of Goods Act § 1 (1979)
(Eng.). This statute was in turn derived from the Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71,
§ 22(1) (1893) (Eng.). Sale of Goods Act, annotation (1979) (Eng.). For cases construing
the market overt rule see The Queen v. Wheeler, 92 Crim. App. 279 (1991).
124. Quoted in O'Neill, supra note 121. The legislation proposed by Lord Renton
became the 1994 amendment of the Sale of Goods Act, and took effect Jan. 3, 1995.
125. The code provides the following:
1. In view of the world-wide concern expressed over the traffic in stolen
antiques and works of art and the illegal export of such objects, the U.K. fine
art and antiques trade wishes to codify its standard practice as follows:
2. Members of the U.K. fine art and antiques trade undertake, to the best of
their ability, not to import, export or transfer the ownership of such objects
where they have reason to believe:
(a) The seller has not established good title to the object under the laws
of the U.K., i.e. whether it has been stolen or otherwise illicitly handled
or acquired.
(b) That an imported object has been acquired in or exported from its
country of export in violation of that country's laws.
(c) That an imported object was acquired dishonestly or illegally from an
official excavation site or monument or originated from an illegal,
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and became binding upon its signatories, who included Christie's,
Sotheby's, and a number of professional societies. 26 Provision 5 of the
code limits its coverage to signatories, so its precepts would not affect
dealers who choose not to subscribe. 27 Despite its apparently noble
objectives, the Code has had, according to some critics, less than rousing
success in meeting those objectives. 28 One major problem 29is that
interpretation of the code falls upon the subscribers themselves)
A difficulty in this regard arose in the wake of Sotheby's offer to sell
a number of ancient Greek vases in December of 1985.130 The curator of
Greco-Roman antiquities at the British Museum pointed out that all the
vases legally excavated up through 1983 from the region where these
objects originated had been catalogued.' 3' While the catalogue could not
be presumed to be totally comprehensive, it did list over 6,000 legally
excavated vases and it would be unlikely to contain a large number of
omissions. Conspicuously missing from the catalogue were all the vases
from the Sotheby's offering, 32 a fact which leads to the logical conclusion
that the vases could have been looted.

clandestine, or otherwise unofficial site.
3. Members also undertake not to exhibit, describe, attribute, appraise, or retain
any object with the intention to promote or fail to prevent its illicit transfer or
export.
4. Where a member of the U.K. fine art and antiques trade comes into the
possession of an object that can be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt to
have been illegally exported from its country of export and the country of
export seeks its return within a reasonable period, that member, if legally free
to do so, will take responsible steps to cooperate in the return of that object to
the country of export. Where the code has been breached unintentionally,
satisfactory reimbursement should be agreed between the parties.
5. Violations of this code of practice will be rigorously investigated.
6. This code which is intended to apply to all objects usually traded in the fine
art and antiques market has been subscribed by the following organizations....
Reprinted in PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 551-52.
126. Paorr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 552.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 554.
129. Id.
130. The British Museum Has Warned the Auctioneers, Sotheby's, that Some of the
Items at Its Antiquities Sale Next Week Have Been Illegally Excavated and Smuggled out
of Italy, OBSERVER, Dec. 1, 1985, at 3.
131.

Id.

132. Id.
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Selling items under these circumstances would therefore seem to be
in contravention to Provision 2(c) of the Code of Practice, which proscribes
dealers from importing, exporting, or selling items which they have
"reasonable cause" to believe were looted from excavation sites. 33 One
might expect a 6,000-item work of scholarship, not to mention the
statement of an expert from the august British Museum, to constitute
reasonable cause. Nonetheless, Sotheby's did not believe that it had
reasonable cause to believe the vases were illicitly removed, and issued a
public statement that as there was no evidence that any of the vases in the
sale had come from a clandestine site, Sotheby's would proceed with the
35
sale."M True to their statement, Sotheby's went through with the sale.
While Sotheby's did at least claim to be complying with the terms of the
Code of Practice, they appear to have reconstrued its "reasonable cause to
believe" requirement: "As can be seen from Sotheby's statement, it seems
that the auction house would have required clear evidence that the vases
had been looted, and would not regard strong evidence that they could not
have been
legally excavated as requiring them to refrain from handling the
36
1

goods."'

Kingdom of Spain v. Christie's illustrates the ineffectiveness of this
self-monitoring system once a court of law was requested to apply the
code. 37 Spain attempted to raise the provisions of the Code in support of
its efforts to stop Christie's sale of a Goya painting, La Marquesa de Santa
Cruz, alleging that Christie's had violated provision 2(b) of the Code of

133. See supra note 125.
134. Sotheby's Still Intends to Go Ahead with Its Auction in Spite of Numerous
Warnings that Several Items Were Excavated Illegally and Smuggled out of Italy,
OBSERVER,

Dec. 8, 1995, at 3.

135. PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 553.
136. Id. The situation was repeated in 1991, when the Greek government got a 24-hour
injunction to keep Sotheby's from selling 42 Cycladic marbles, which the Greeks believed
had been looted. Jean Stead, UK: Greek Injunction on Cycladic Marbles Sale at Sotheby's,
GUARDIAN, July 6, 1990, at 24. The court refused to extend the injunction, and in an outof-court settlement, the Greek government was allowed to purchase three sculptures from
the group before the sale in exchange for relinquishing its claim to the items. Godfrey
Barker, UK: Greeks Buy "Smuggled"Sculptures,DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 11, 1990, at 19.
As of this writing, Sotheby's is contemplating limiting its sales of antiquities to items
whose provenance is well documented, in response to the accusations that the auction
house has sold smuggled items. Godfrey Barker, UK: Sotheby's May Cut Antiquity Sales,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 12, 1997, at 9.
137. Kingdom of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1120,
1125 (Ch. Div'l Ct. 1986).
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Practice.'
Provision 2(b) provides, in relevant part, that dealers shall not
import, export, or sell any object which they have reasonable cause to
believe "has been acquired in or exported from its country of export in
violation of that country's laws."'
In his opinion, Vice Chancellor
Browne-Wilkinson admitted that he was initially inclined to agree: "At first
sight I thought that under clause 2(b) of the Code, if it were established
that the picture had been exported from Spain with the use of forged
documents, Christie's, giving
effect to that clause would not have been
' 40
prepared to auction it."'
Christie's, however, took the position that provision 2(b) "does not
apply where the vendor has acquired the picture innocently (i.e., is not
implicated in the illegal export)."'' Instead, Christie's argued that because
it was not implicated in the illegal export, the transaction was actually
covered under clause 4 of the Code. 42 Under this provision, "satisfactory
reimbursement should be agreed between the parties" when the dealer is
legally unable to return the object (as when British law recognizes the title
vested in a third party). 43 In any case, the point was moot as far as the
court was concerned:
Whether Christie's are right on either of those views is not for
this court to say. The fact is that Christie's are prepared to and
will go ahead with the sale, even if the documents are found by
the court to be forgeries. In any event the Code is not a
document on which the Spanish government can directly rely; it
is not a party to the code.'4
The principle laid down in Kingdom of Spain v. Christie's thus seems
clear: the British courts will not give effect to Code of Practice for the
Control of International Trading
in Works of Art if a party is not a
45
signatory to the agreement.

138. Id.at 1120.
139. Id.at 1124.
140. Id. at 1125.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The validity of Christie's position has been questioned on several
bases.'4 6 Clause 2(b) and clause 4 do not seem mutually exclusive, nor
does clause 4 override clause 2(b). 147 Clause 4 simply constitutes a pledge
to cooperate in the return of an illegally exported object to its country of
origin if it is legally possible to do so:
There is no reason why this obligation should nullify that of
Article 2(b), which is not to import, export or transfer ownership
of such an object. Even where the auction house was not legally
well
free to return the object to Spain. . , it could still perfectly
48
object.
the
with
transactions
conducting
refrain from
In this respect, the fact that Christie's contested the applicability of the
apparently relevant provision and determined to go on with the sale recalls
Sotheby's position on the Greek vases. 149 Given the broad latitude
exercised by the parties to the Code, it seems that relatively few
transactions would fall within its exclusions.' 50
Several major deficiencies with the Code ultimately come to light.
Even though possible violations of the Code are to be "rigourously
investigated" in accordance with provision 5, the court's declaration in
Kingdom of Spain v. Christie's has the effect of depriving the most
aggrieved party of the power to initiate such an investigation because he
or she is not party to the agreement. 5 ' In addition, a position such as
Christie's will necessarily go unchallenged, for the Code appoints no
authority to interpret it.' 52 Finally, it is not clear what measures would be
taken should a breach of the Code be declared, for it does not stipulate any
penalties. 5 3
Ultimately, this means that the Code of Practice for the Control of
International Trading in Works of Art has little real effect on reducing the
illicit trade in art and antiques. 1 4 As two commentators have rather wryly
expressed it, "All in all, the British government can hardly be surprised, in

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 553.

Id.
Id.
PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 552.

Id at 553-554.
Id. at 554.
Id. The British courts have plainly declined such a role. Id.
PROTTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 554.
Id.
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the light of these events, if exporting countries fail to regard the adoption
of the Code as a major substantive advance against illicit trade.' 5 5
C. Art Loss Register
Established by a private London based company, the Art Loss Register
is a computer database to flag stolen art works and antiques. 5 6 The Art
Loss Register's databases currently contain over 70,000 images of stolen
art and antiques, which are reviewed by dealers, collectors, and law
enforcement officials throughout Europe and North America.'57 It provides
an accurate method for dealers to make a good faith effort to verify that
any works that they handle are not stolen goods.' s
The Art Loss Register is an effective tool as far as curbing the
trafficking in stolen art is concerned, but it is less useful as a means of
controlling illegal export, because it does not register illegally exported
objects.' 59 In this respect, it can only address one aspect of the illicit art
trade.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has pointed out certain regulatory schemes
which the United Kingdom has avoided or continues to avoid, and other
which it has accepted more readily. Obviously, any recommendation needs
to be pragmatic and take into consideration that the most effective reforms
may also meet the most resistance. A balancing of interests here chiefly
involves an evaluation of which controls have worked and which controls
are likely never to be accepted because of the interests of the marketing
community.
Accordingly, the most effective regulation would center on the
principles that the art market has already accepted. Such a body of rules
already exists in the Code of Practice.' 60 While the Code has been

155. Id.
156. Raffanelli, supra note 85, at 564.
157. Jessica Gorst-Williams, Money-Go-Round: Crooks Get Thieving Down to a Fine
Art, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 4, 1995, at 8. Any stolen item valued at more than 250
pounds can be registered. Id. The registration fee is 20 pounds, but in some instances
insurers will pay the registration fee. Id.

158. See generally Raffanelli, supra note 85, at 564.
159. Id.
160. PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 18, at 551-52.
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criticized as ineffectual, and courts have refused to give it the force of law,
this does not mean that its rules could not be codified as legislation. The
Code of Practice could be enacted as part of a dealer registration program.
As Prott and O'Keefe have suggested, dealer licensing schemes in general
6
can be an effective means of reducing the illicit trade in art.' ' The licenses
of dealers who violate those ideals by selling illicitly traded works could
be revoked, thereby preventing them from further engaging in such
practices. The risk of losing a license would moreover deter many dealers
from selling illicitly traded works. In this manner, the dealers would be
firmly regulated in accordance with their own professional ideals.
Eventually, London's reputation as a convenient marketplace for illicitly
traded art works would diminish, and traffickers of such works would
cease to attempt to sell them there.
D. Michael Roberts

161. Id. at 553, 568.

